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Abstract
Major trends in the airline industry are analyzed to highlight key dynamics that govern the US domestic 
air transportation system.  The hypothesis is that air travel supply and demand equilibriums, a reliance 
on outside capital, and intra-industry competition are among the most critical forces that are driving the 
current restructuring of the airline industry.  Data on airline operational and financial performance is used 
to trace these dynamics as the industry evolved through periods of industry deregulation, an economic 
growth bubble, and the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
The thesis identifies the post-deregulation development of hub-and-spoke networks and yield 
management systems as the key forces that would set the stage for a bifurcation of the air travel market 
during a cycle of economic growth in the late 1990’s.  During this bubble economy, the dynamics of 
supply and demand fundamentally shifted as the major carriers focused on high-revenue, high-cost 
operations and travelers began to flock to newer low-fare, low-cost carriers.  With the end of the economic 
growth cycle in 2000, the bifurcation of the airline industry began to affect revenues and profits at the 
major carriers.  Massive and unprecedented industry losses would ensue, and would be compounded by 
the attacks of 9/11.
Airline operational strategies in response to 9/11 and longer-term restructuring efforts are discussed in 
order to further identify the key dynamics affecting the air transportation system.  These dynamics are 
synthesized and then discussed within the broader context of the air transportation system, the impact of 
air travel on the economy and mobility, and the role of government.
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The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the current financial crisis within the airline industry have 
highlighted the critical instabilities in the structure of the US air transportation system.  Although changes 
in traffic, declining revenues, and increased costs were all issues which were structurally present well 
before 9/11, the subsequent operational changes has made it easier to identify their effects on airline 
performance.  Capacity and customer service issues—aside from security delays—were removed from the 
equation.  Airline profitability has clearly emerged as the key issue facing the US airline industry today.
This thesis attempts to explore the dynamics of the air transportation system—looking at recent responses 
to major shocks and fundamental changes in the relationship between supply and demand.  Starting with 
an overview of major industry forces since deregulation, the thesis will look at how airline strategies 
during the economic boom of the late 1990’s may have set the stage for the current restructuring efforts.  
These longer-term trends will be set within the context of industry responses and strategies after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 in order to look at the robustness of the air transportation system and 
provide some guidance as to how air mobility could be stabilized and preserved.
The air transportation system is an extremely complex, and airline actions are driven by a host of 
different factors—including competition, finance, organizational structure, consumer demand, and even 
technology.  Although much has already been written in the media or academic journals on the airline 
industry, the goal of this thesis is to bring together current trends and information in a holistic manner.  
By identifying the key dynamics and interrelationships within the air transportation system, this paper 
should also inform subsequent research and modeling investigations into the relationship between air 
transportation, the economy, and society.
Chapter 1:
Introduction and Background
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1.1  Air Transportation and the Economy
One of goals of this thesis is to begin to understand and evaluate the dynamics at play within the airline 
industry and the broader air transportation system.  Simple conceptual models can be useful at structuring 
such analyses and enabling key relationships to be identified and expanded.  Sussman uses the CLIOS 
framework to understand the complexity, scale, integration, and openness of transportation systems.1  
While air transportation is clearly a CLIOS, an analysis of its dynamics also needs to account for the 
industry forces that regulate the supply and accessibility of its services.
Yet the openness and integration of the system makes these industry forces highly subject to a range of 
motivating factors and dynamics that cannot necessarily be modeled or documented in their entirety.  
Even relatively obscure details such as executive compensation packages can affect airline strategies; 
hidden motivations to force a company into liquidation, for example, could play a role in pricing 
strategies and overall industry competition.  Porter’s five forces model also attempts to understand the 
competitive intra-industry dynamics, but does not look at the broader role of the transportation system.2
To better understand the air travel supply and demand relationships with the larger US economy as well 
as with individual airline companies, a conceptual model was developed.  Figure 1-1 shows this model of 
the relationship between the economy and the air transportation system.  The model sets up the external 
relationship between the economy (shown in the upper left corner) and the air transportation system 
(shaded in gray on the lower right).  The internal relationship between the air travel supply-demand 
equilibrium and the airline companies is shown within the gray box.
Figure 1-1.  Conceptual model of air transportation system and the economy.
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The economy generates a Travel Need which creates the Demand for air transportation services.  The 
Supply of air transportation services, in turn, provides an Economic Enabling Effect that creates access 
to people, markets, ideas and capital and thus enables the economy to function at a regional or national 
level.  These relationships between Supply, Demand, and the Economy illustrate the basic macro 
functionality of the air transportation system.  Economic growth in the mid-1990’s caused growth in air 
travel and enabled the airlines to rethink their business strategies.  The subsequent economic recession, 
however, caused a major downturn in travel demand.  The economy exhibits cyclical characteristics, 
however, and the demand for business and leisure travel should return as the economy recovers.  
The model further illustrates how the internal structure of the Air Transportation System (gray box) is 
based on the profitability of the airline industry.  This internal feedback loop connects the demand for 
air travel to airline revenues and the supply of air transportation.  Airlines control the Supply of air 
transportation by modifying Prices, Networks, and Schedules, which in turn have a major impact on the 
Demand for air transportation services.
Finally, the model also shows the traditional financial relationships between the economy and the airline 
industry (shown in dashed lines).  The Economy influences the ability of the Airlines to secure capital 
Equity and finance Debt.  Employment and spending by the airlines, in turn, have Direct, Indirect, and 
Induced impacts on the economy.  The performance of the economy also generally affects how the capital 
markets support and invest in the airline industry.  
Economic Cycles and the Airline Industry
The close linkages between air travel and the 
economy makes the airlines extremely subject to 
cyclic forces of market supply and demand.  The 
economy is one of the forces that plays a key role 
in shaping the airline industry, and the growth 
of air travel has historically tracked with that of 
basic economic performance.  This relationship 
can be seen by analyzing increases in the US 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) alongside the 
growth of domestic air travel.  Constant 1996 
dollars were used to measure the relative increase 
in GDP between 1954 and 2001, while air travel 
was measured using Revenue Passenger Miles 
(RPMs).  Periods of economic recessions as 
identified by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research were also highlighted in gray3.  Figure 
1-2 illustrates that the growth of air traffic has 
historically tracked with the rise in GDP, and that 
rises in enplanements followed those for GDP.  The 
annual percentage change in RPMs and GDP was 
also analyzed in order to further investigate this 
relationship.  Figure 1-3 confirms that there was a 
close correlation between annual economic growth 
and air travel, as changes in one were always 
Figure 1-2:  Growth of GDP and RPMs, 1954-
2000 with economic recessions.  Source: US 
BEA and BTS data with NBER classification of 
recession periods.
Figure 1-3:  Annual Change in GDP and Domes-
tic RPMs, 1954-2000 with economic recessions.  
Source: US BEA and BTS data with NBER classifi-
cation of recession periods.
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accompanied by changes in the other.
 
The cyclic nature of the economy and the demand for air travel can also be seen in the performance of 
airline profits.  Historically, periods of successively higher profits in the US airline industry during the 
1960’s 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s were followed by record losses.  Figure 1-4 depicts the net profits and 
losses of the US major, national, and regional passenger and cargo airlines in current-year dollars.  Losses 
in the airline industry generally also corresponded with the periods of economic recessions shaded in 
gray.  The cycles of profits and losses have also exhibited an exponentially growing oscillatory profit and 
loss behavior since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978.
As such, periods of successfully record profits have been similarly followed by periods of record losses.  
The airline industry lost $1.4 billion during the economic recession of the early 1980’s.  This was 
followed by an up-cycle between 1984 and 1989, when the industry earned a total of $3.8 billion.  During 
the next recession and down-cycle between 1990 
and 1994, the industry lost an unprecedented $13.1 
billion dollars—but this itself was overshadowed 
by record profits of $23 billion dollars between 
1995 and 2000.  These gains were quickly wiped 
out, however, as the industry lost over $7 billion 
dollars in 2001 and over $11 billion dollars in 
2003.
The marketplace of air travel also exhibits 
fundamentally cyclic characteristics, as airline 
profits are tied to supply and market prices.  
Increased airline profits encourage new airlines to 
enter the market and existing airlines to increase 
their own supply and gain market share.  Similarly, reductions in profit are theoretically linked to 
reductions in supply, although operational constraints make it easier to use pricing to manipulate supply 
rather than physically removing capacity.
In general, understanding the dynamics of these cycles can help to indicate whether or not they will 
persist over time and have a longer-term effect on the air transportation system4.  This can also help 
to find key relationships within the system that are not fundamentally linked to cyclical trends.  As 
will be seen in subsequent chapters, the changes in stock prices and the withdrawal of capital from the 
airline industry shows that investors have decoupled themselves from the cycles of airline industry—a 
fundamental change to the airline business and one which will possibly require new strategies to preserve 
domestic air service connectivity.
1.2 Research Methodology
To identify the key dynamics and recent changes within the air transportation system, this thesis uses a 
case-study analysis of individual airlines and on the industry as a whole.  The analysis looks at macro-
level industry-wide trends and micro-level individual airline strategies in order to more fully examine the 
motivations and dynamics within the air transportation system.  The recent impacts of and responses to 
major exogenous shocks to the airline industry such as the attacks of 9/11 will be also used to highlight 
the dynamics of the air transportation system.
Figure 1-4:  Airline industry net profit and loss-
es with economic recession data, 1965-2001.  
Source:  US DOT Form 41 data and NBER data.
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Airline strategies and key trends have been primarily identified through airline media releases, media 
reports, and other sources.  Standard industry financial and operating performance data is being 
synthesized with other media reports and sources to corroborate these trends.  Data sources include the 
US Department of Transportation DB-1A ten-percent sample of ticket receipts and the Form 41 database 
of traffic and airline operating statistics.  Industry stock prices and market capitalization data were also 
tracked and analyzed to look at the relationship between the financial markets and the airline industry.  
Airline schedule data from the Official Airline Guide, individual carrier timetables, and the FAA 
Enhanced Traffic Management Database System were also used to analyze the operational changes to 
airline networks.  In general, the thesis concentrates on a network-level analysis of the air transportation 
system, and does not get into specific analyses of 
competition on specific routes or travel markets. 
The thesis is focused primarily on analyzing the 
position and strategy of the ten major US carriers.  
Monthly air carrier traffic data on domestic and 
total system-wide revenue passenger miles was 
used to compare the relative market size of the 
ten major US carriers.  This is shown in Figure 
1-5, and the carriers are sorted by domestic 
market share from left to right.  It was also found 
that these carriers collectively accounted for 86 
percent of the total domestic revenue passenger 
miles in 2001.5  Six of these carriers—American, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways—all operate large, multi-hub networks with 
extensive international connections and large regional commuter feeder services.  These airlines are also 
among those in the most severe financial jeopardy after the downturn in 2000.  The other four major 
carriers differ in network size, operating philosophies, and cost structures and thus almost share more 
commonalities with low-cost carriers such as AirTran or JetBlue.
The low-cost model pioneered by Southwest Airlines is the primary antithesis to big network carriers, 
and its integrated national point-to-point network was able to sustain its profitability throughout the 
current industry crisis.  America West and Alaska have significantly smaller operations than the other 
major carriers, but have the advantage of lower cost structures than the other majors due to bankruptcies 
and restructuring during the mid-1990s.  ATA operates a more limited network of charter and scheduled 
services, and it only recently achieved status as a US major carrier when revenues surpassed $1 billion 
dollars in 1999.6  The emergence of smaller low-cost carriers has also had a major impact on the airline 
industry in recent years, however, and the impact of AirTran and JetBlue will also be discussed.
It should be noted that while intercontinental connectivity is one of the key roles of aviation, this thesis 
focuses on the role of domestic air travel in the United States.  One of the underlying motivations behind 
this thesis was initially to understand how the connectivity of the air transportation system provides 
a strategic advantage for the US by facilitating enhanced regional and national economic and social 
integration.  Although this analysis largely ignores the feedback effects of employment and mobility on 
the economy, these impacts are significant.  It is estimated that US commercial aviation was responsible 
for over $800 billion dollars in direct, indirect, and induced employment in 2000—about 8 percent of 
the US economy.7  Although identifying and accounting for the economic opportunity benefits from 
connectivity and mobility is outside the scope and capability of this thesis, it nevertheless remains a 
worthy challenge which is faced by the airline industry and governments alike.
Figure 1-5:  US Major domestic and internation-
al RPMs, 2001.  Source: US DOT Form 41 data, 
Schedule T-1.  (6)
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The deregulation of the airline industry in 1978 triggered a set of dynamics that would reshape the air 
transportation system and set the stage for dramatic growth in domestic air travel.  The industry developed 
comprehensive national hub-and-spoke systems to expand the scope and connectivity of their route 
networks, while yield management systems gave the airlines pricing power to manipulate demand to 
match supply.  Low-fare carriers also brought the dynamics of price competition and cost control into the 
airline industry.  Indeed, many of these dynamics that emerged after deregulation still plague the airline 
industry today.  This chapter will describe the structural evolution of the airline industry and will set the 
context for subsequent discussions on the dynamics during and after the Internet economic boom of the 
late 1990’s.
2.1 Deregulation
Prior to 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated entry, routes, and fares7 in order to promote 
stability in the air transportation system.  It was felt that the production economies of scale would 
eventually lead to monopolies and degraded service, and the avoidance of excessive competition would 
help to maintain the system.8  Amidst a wave of political support for deregulation and a growing body 
of academic research that disputed these long-held beliefs, administrative deregulation actually began as 
early as 1975.  The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 eliminated CAB authority over routes and domestic 
fares.
The supply of and demand for domestic air transportation grew dramatically after deregulation.  In 
order to fully document the changes in the supply of air transportation, the growth in passenger traffic 
Chapter 2:
Post-Deregulation Evolution
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and airline capacity was analyzed.  The growth 
in domestic capacity was measured in terms of 
Available Seat Miles (ASMs), while Revenue 
Passenger Miles (RPMs) were used to measure 
traffic.  Figure 2-1 shows that scheduled RPMs 
grew considerably faster after deregulation than in 
the period between 1954 and 1978.  Between 1954 
and 1978, RPMs grew at an average annual rate 
of 5.8 million RPMs per year, but this more than 
doubled during the period between 1978 and 2002 
to an average rate over 11.7 million RPMs per 
year.  Airline capacity grew accordingly with this 
increased demand.  Figure 2-2 shows the growth 
of scheduled ASMs together with the growth in 
RPMs.  Scheduled annual ASMs increased from 
300 billion in 1978 to over 700 billion by 2000.  
2.2 Network Development
A fundamental restructuring of the air 
transportation system occurred after deregulation 
as the industry consolidated and developed hub-
and-spoke networks.  Defacto hubs had naturally 
developed in large regional centers such as 
Chicago, Atlanta, and Dallas.  The large population 
and economic nodal function of these major cities created large markets for local traffic and supported a 
natural concentration of flights.  Interline connections between airlines were commonplace and frequent.  
The Civil Aeronautics Board, however, generally limited the extent to which airlines could buildup their 
operations at any single airport in order to preserve local competition.
After deregulation, however, airlines moved to develop their individual hubs and to capture as much 
online connecting traffic as possible.  Vertical consolidation throughout the industry occurred as airlines 
developed regional feeder services using turboprop aircraft and acquired international route authorities.  
Horizontal consolidation was also undertaken through mergers and acquisitions—creating instant 
nationwide or regional networks.  While the hub-and-spoke concept was not new, the development of 
comprehensive route networks became one of the primary dynamics that drove the airline industry in the 
years after deregulation.  The dominance of these hub-and-spoke networks would affect the intra-industry 
dynamics well into the 1990’s.
Hub-and-Spoke
The relaxation of CAB controls enabled airlines to actively build coordinated route systems to increase 
network scope and market share.  These hub-and-spoke systems funneled passenger connections from 
multiple cities through a central hub.  This enabled the maximum number of city-pair combinations 
to be covered with a minimum number of flights.   This consolidation of demand offered fundamental 
economies of scale—enabling service to smaller cities or other weak markets that wouldn’t otherwise 
Figure 2-2:  RPM and ASM growth, 1954-2002.  
Source:  US DOT and ATA data.
Figure 2-1:  RPMs before and after deregula-
tion.  Source:  US DOT and ATA data.
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be covered in a point-to-point network.  The difference is that in a point-to-point network, each route 
needs to support itself based on the local traffic between those two cities.  In contrast, new cities can be 
added and justified to a hub-and-spoke networks based on the incremental revenue generated to the entire 
network.
Two other characteristics of hub-and-spoke systems made them extremely popular service strategies.  The 
first is that by being able to consolidate smaller, more discrete levels of demand to more destinations, a 
hub-and-spoke system would enable a given airline to support more frequent services out of any given 
airport.  The increased frequency would give the airline a greater market share and would enable them to 
better serve the needs of time-sensitive, high-revenue business travelers.  
The second characteristic is that hub-and-spoke systems gave airlines a strategic advantage on the 
display screens of computer reservation systems (CRS).  Hub and spoke systems would enable airlines 
to offer more frequencies and thus display a greater presence to travel agents—increasing the likelihood 
of making a sale.  The logic behind CRS displays also encouraged airlines to create tightly scheduled 
operations at major hubs.  Because travel times were used to rank the order of display on flight screens, 
airlines had an incentive to offer the fastest travel time between two places.  Airlines concentrated flight 
arrivals and departures at hub airports into extremely narrow time windows in order to minimize the 
ground time between connecting flights.  This peaking effect also would dictate greatly increased terminal 
requirements and staffing requirements at hub airports—resulting in increased employment and major 
terminal expansion projects during the 1980’s and 1990’s.
The growth of hub-and-spoke operations can be 
illustrated by an analysis of historical operations 
at one airport.  During 2001, Atlanta’s Hartsfield 
International Airport was the busiest airport in 
the world in terms of enplanements (75.8 million 
passengers), and the second busiest in terms of 
aircraft operations (890,000 movements).  As 
shown in Figure 2-3, Atlanta is a large transfer 
hub for Delta Airlines and its regional affiliates.  
Together, they operated 850 flights per day to 133 
destinations in the contiguous United States on 
an average day during Summer 2000.  Flights to 
and from Atlanta accounted for 40 percent of the 
Delta’s entire domestic operations. 
To show the evolution of the hub and the growth of the highly connected hub-and-spoke bank structure, 
the OAG flight schedule data for all carriers at Atlanta was analyzed at selected intervals between 
1965 and 2000.  Figure 2-4 illustrates the evolution of the banking structure using a histogram of all 
scheduled flight arrivals in 15-minute increments on an average summer weekday.9  The plot for 1965 
shows a concentration of scheduled flights around the mid-morning and late afternoon periods.  In 
1978, the development of the bank structure is already starting to be evident.  The banking structure 
can be identified in the 1986 analysis by the high peaking of flights—between 25 and 40 flights per 15-
minute period, although the presence of two major airline hubs (Delta and Eastern) shows the effect of 
competition at that time.  The full nine-bank structure had been clearly developed by 2000.
Figure 2-3:  Example of a hub-and-spoke net-
work showing routes served by Delta Air Lines 
from its Atlanta hub in July 2000.   Source: OAG 
data.
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Industry Consolidation
In the two decades after deregulation, the airline industry went through a period of significant 
consolidation as airlines merged or liquidated their assets.   Airline acquisitions or mergers often 
complemented the development of hub-and-spoke systems—enabling airlines to feed their networks 
with regional and international traffic and increasing their market share and scope.  When Delta acquired 
Western in 1986, it picked up a hub in Salt Lake City as well as a strong presence along the West Coast.  
Pan Am’s sale of its Pacific Division in 1986 enabled United to merge a relatively strong domestic 
transcontinental network with a large international feed.  In addition, smaller, twin-engine long-range 
aircraft also enabled inland regional hubs like Atlanta or Dallas to become international gateways—thus 
increasing the strength and overall strategic importance of major hubs.
Industry consolidation also came about as a result of liquidation.  While numerous startup carriers failed 
during the years after deregulation, some larger and more notable carriers such as Braniff, Eastern, and 
Pan Am were also liquidated.  Although these failures did remove large amounts of capacity from the 
industry, the overall net impact was less due to the smaller market share presence.  Consolidation also 
occurred over time as airlines pulled out of entire markets and eliminated smaller hubs.  During the 
economic recession of the early 1990’s, American and USAir effectively closed down their west coast 
operations and smaller hubs at Raleigh-Durham, Dayton, and Nashville.
Figure 2-4:  Histogram of scheduled weekday arrivals per 15-minute interval at Atlanta for selected 
years between 1965 and 2000 shows the evolution of tight hub-and-spoke banking structure.  
Source:  Author’s analysis using OAG data.
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2.3 Other Industry Trends
Other trends after deregulation include included early competition from low-fare carriers, the 
development of customer loyalty programs, and the implementation of yield management systems.  These 
trends would shape the relationship between low-fare and major network carriers, and would set the 
stage for the evolution of the industry dynamics during the internet economic bubble.  Yield management 
and network size made the major carriers relatively immune to the competition from these early low-
fare carriers.  This coexistence seemed to suggest that the airline industry could survive with these 
two radically different business models—thus enabling the big network carriers to target high-revenue 
passengers and sustain high-cost operations.
A number of new startup airlines entered the market after deregulation to compete with the established 
carriers.  In the early 1980’s, airlines like People Express developed niche low-fare, no-frills strategies 
to stimulate the demand for low-cost travel.  While these low-fare carriers were popular, they did not 
have a significant impact on the long-term structure of the industry for a variety of reasons.  The major 
network carriers had only limited exposure to 
low-cost competition, since they did provide a 
substantially different product with larger route 
networks, higher levels of customer service, and 
new frequent flyer programs.  In addition, issues 
with airline reputation, safety, and convenience 
presumably outweighed the cost savings for many 
passengers.  Poor management and rapid expansion 
also sent many startup carriers into liquidation.  
Nevertheless, there were a few notable exceptions.  
Southwest Airlines was able to begin expanding its 
successful point-to-point network model beyond 
Texas into other parts of the country.  With a 
sustainable growth strategy of serving city-pair markets with relatively high volumes of local traffic, 
Southwest was able to gradually build its reputation and niche base of low-fare customers.  The point-to-
point route network for Southwest on a typical weekday in summer 2000 was plotted using OAG data and 
is shown in Figure 2-5.  This point-to-point network shows a distinct contrast from the centralized hub 
model used by Delta at Atlanta and other major carriers elsewhere.
One major reason that limited the impact of low-cost carriers in the early years after deregulation was the 
development of yield management systems.  Advances in seat inventory control and automated pricing 
systems enabled the major carriers to effectively 
compete with low-fare airlines without diluting 
their entire inventory and revenues.  By offering 
different prices for virtual groupings of seats, the 
airlines could offer a range of fares differentiated 
by both price and other ticketing restrictions.  It 
enabled airlines to offer low fares to stimulate 
demand and sell-off excess seat inventory while 
preserving the revenue from passengers willing 
to pay higher fares.   The ability to increase 
load factors and maximize revenues effectively 
insulated the majors from the early low-cost 
carriers, and gave them a way to compete.
Figure 2-5:  Southwest point-to-point network, 
Summer 2000.  Source: OAG data.
Figure 2-6:  Declining real yields after deregula-
tion (in 1978 dollars).  Source: ATA data.
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Yield management resulted in increased load 
factors and increased airline profitability.  The 
impact of these practices was analyzed at the 
industry level by looking at historical data on 
airline revenue and traffic.  Airline yields (the 
average price paid per passenger-mile) were 
examined using constant 1978 dollars in order to 
account for inflation.  Figure 2-6 shows that the 
average yield has been continually declining since 
the 1960s, although this decline slowed in the 
1990s.  At the same time, Figure 2-7 shows that the 
average industry domestic load factors increased 
from about 60 percent in 1978 up to 72 percent in 
2000.  This indicates that even though prices on 
average were going down, airplanes had more seats 
filled and were thus generating more revenue per 
flight. 
Figure 2-7:  Average industrywide domestic 
load factors, 1954-2002.  Source: US DOT Form 
41 data and ATA.
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The economic boom of the late 1990’s affected the dynamics of supply and demand as airlines adjusted 
their operating strategies and passengers modified their travel behavior.  While these dynamics enabled 
record industry profits, the hypothesis is that these changes set the stage for heavy losses once the 
economic growth began to slow.  The factors identified in this chapter include changes to the pricing 
and availability of airline seats as well as modifications to airline route networks and fundamental cost 
structures.  In addition, changes in the demand for and attitudes towards low-cost air travel began to 
increase the effects of competition between different segments of the airline industry.  Altogether, these 
factors would ultimately shape airline strategies in dealing with the economic downturn and events of 
9/11.
3.1 The Bubble Economy 
Here, the notion of the “bubble economy” is used to refer to the dramatic US economic growth during 
the mid-to-late 1990’s.  This growth cycle was partially fueled by the development of the internet and the 
investment boom in startup dot-com companies.  Between 1992 and 2000, the real gross domestic product 
increased by $2.3 trillion in 1996 dollars,10 while annual growth rates ranged from 2.7 to 4.1 percent.11  
The fundamental relationship between economic growth and the demand for air travel translated into 
record traffic loads and profits for the airline industry during this period.  Between 1990 and 2000, the 
domestic revenue passenger miles at the major US carriers12 increased by 40 percent from 338 to 474 
billion RPMs.  Total capacity increased by only 23 percent, however, thus load factors climbed to record 
levels.  The average load factor in 1990 was 60.5 percent, but that had increased to 71.7 percent by 2000.
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To examine the industry earnings during 
the economic bubble, US Department of 
Transportation (DOT) data on airline financial 
performance was analyzed.  Figure 3-1 shows the 
total net profits earned by the US majors during 
the 1990s.13  Total net profits among the major 
US carriers increased from $1.8 billion dollars in 
1995 to over $5 billion dollars just two years later.  
Profits at American and Delta exceeded $1 billion 
dollars in 1998, and United joined them during the 
following year.  Even Southwest Airlines earned a 
net profit of over $600 million dollars in 2000.  
Airline stock prices and market activity on the 
last trading day of each month between 1990 and 
2000 were compiled to investigate the relationship 
between airline performance, the economy, and 
investor activity.  Market capitalization was used 
to estimate of the relative value of each airline,14 
and was calculated from the closing stock price 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares.  
The combined market capitalization of the majors 
is shown in Figure 3-2.15   The total market 
capitalization of the airline industry increased from 
$11.4 billion in 1990 to a peak of $49.0 billion 
in April of 1999—an increase of 330 percent.  
This dramatic increase in valuation of the airline 
industry during the late 1990’s corresponds with 
the record profits and the strong economy, and 
suggest that these forces are certainly interrelated.
3.2 Airline Strategies
During the late 1990’s, traditional issues surrounding labor relations, airspace congestion, network 
alliances, and customer service continued to plague the airline industry as they did during previous 
decades, but these trends did not necessarily represent a fundamental departure from earlier years.  Yet 
increased traffic and record industry earnings during the Internet bubble generally enabled the major 
carriers to adopt business strategies without feeling the effects of the stiff competition from smaller, low-
cost airlines.  
Driven in part by the strong economy and high investor expectations, major trends that began to transform 
the industry included more aggressive yield management and the shift to regional jet aircraft.  The strong 
economy enabled airlines to focus on increasing revenues through aggressive yield management practices 
and focusing on higher-revenue business travelers.  Regional jets were also deployed to enhance service, 
increase network competition, and boost market share.  In general, the additional traffic and revenue 
generated by these strategies enabled the airlines to increase spending on capital improvements and 
labor—changing their fundamental cost structure and relationship with low-fare travel markets.
Figure 3-2:  Increase in market capitalization of 
US major carriers, 1990-2000.  Source:  Author’s 
calculations from WRDS data.
Figure 3-1: Net profits at US major carriers, 
1990-2000.    Source:  Author’s calculations from 
US DOT Form 41 Data, Schedule P-1.2.
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Yield Management
The refinement of yield management techniques during the economic boom of the late 1990’s increased 
revenues at the major network carriers.  Airline strategies were focused on overall system-wide revenue 
instead of the profitability or yields of individual flights.  In an integrated hub-and-spoke system where 
it becomes difficult to allocate revenues to specific flights, the measure of total overall network revenue 
becomes extremely important.  Advanced-generation revenue management systems, for example, could 
refuse a request for a low-fare seat between Boston and Chicago if that seat would displace a higher-fare 
passenger connecting from Boston through Chicago to Seattle.
As they refined their revenue management skills, the network carriers continued to use this pricing 
power to compete with low-cost carriers and to fill seats at the last-minute that would have otherwise 
gone unsold.   The economic bubble had created an environment where yield management systems could 
successfully extract more revenue from passengers who needed to travel while also stimulating demand 
for discretionary travel.  In this perfect environment, the healthy economy and the increased monetary 
circulation generally resulted in increased business and personal air travel budgets.  Companies could 
afford to spend more on business-related travel expenses, while individuals had more discretionary 
income for leisure travel.
To illustrate the changes in network pricing strategies, the evolution of fares in one specific city-
pair market at one major airline was analyzed using the US DOT DB-1A ten-percent sample of all 
domestic tickets.  Although this example does not necessarily account for the effects of competition, 
aircraft size, and other factors, it nevertheless provides some insight into the pricing actions within the 
industry.16  The market between New York-Kennedy and Los Angeles was selected because it is a highly 
competitive market linking the two largest cities in the United States with basically no alternate mode 
of transportation.  Figure 3-3 shows the distribution of the fares purchased using a histogram set at $100 
dollar intervals.  Only the middle 90 percent is plotted in order to reduced the effect of frequent flyer 
award tickets, non-revenue travel, and other data anomalies.  
The data shows several key changes.  The average current-dollar fare actually dropped between 1985 
and 1990, but had increased significantly by 1998.  This is important because at the same time, there was 
1998 Q3
Sample size: 3633 (4042 total)
Highest: $1468 Lowest: $90
Mean: $494
Multiplier: 16.3
1985 Q3
Sample size: 1738 (1937 total)
Highest: $741 Lowest: $72
Mean:  $340
Multiplier: 10.3
1990 Q3
Sample size: 2293 (2252 total)
Highest: $1016 Lowest: $89
Mean: $335
Multiplier: 11.42
Figure 3-3:  Histograms showing distribution of one-way airfares purchased between 
New York-JFK and Los Angeles for selected years on American Airlines.  Middle 90 per-
cent of fares shown in current-year dollars.  Source: Author’s calculations from US DOT DB1A 
data.
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a distinct increase in the gap between the highest and lowest fares.  The ratio between the highest and 
lowest fares increased from 10.3 in 1985 up to 16.3 in 1998.  In addition, the number of passengers in the 
lowest fare segments had increased dramatically by 1998, creating a much more skewed distribution of 
passengers at the lower end.  While these changes were able to preserve and even enhance overall yields 
in the face of stiff low-cost competition, it is thought that the increased volume of lower-fare traffic and 
the growing spread between fares began to change the overall passenger perception of airline pricing 
systems.
While revenue management was highly successful at extracting higher revenues from the travelers, it 
had the possibly unintended consequence of changing passenger attitudes towards the airline industry.  
Customer dissatisfaction with paying enormous fares for last-minute travel or travel without a Saturday 
night stay began to increase the attractiveness of low-cost carriers, many of which offered more flexible 
ticketing rules.  Further discussion about the impact of bubble-era yield management on travel demand is 
in Section 3.3. 
Regional Jets
The advent of regional jets was another major development in the airline industry during the bubble 
economy.  Airlines were eager to differentiate themselves, and the regional jets offered a way to provide 
better service.  Regional jets introduced a smaller unit of capacity (35 to 70 seats) into airline fleets, 
Figure 3-4:  Plot showing 
growth of domestic routes 
operated by regional jet 
aircraft, 1998 and 2000.  
Source: OAG data.
1998
2000
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enabling them to provide enhanced service and increased capacity in smaller markets that couldn’t 
support traditional mainline jet service.  With faster cruising speeds, regional jets could fly on longer 
routes than turboprops and could thus enable hubs to be expanded and strengthened.  In addition, regional 
jets could be used on point-to-point flights to bypass major hubs.  
Regional jets were rapidly introduced throughout airline networks during the mid-1990’s.  Schedule data 
from the Official Airline Guide was sorted by aircraft type and used to determine the number of routes 
used by regional jet aircraft.17  Figure 3-4 shows that the number of nonstop domestic city-pairs served 
by regional jets increased from over 380 in May 1998 to over 950 by July 2000.  By 2002, the number of 
routes had increased to over 1500.  This growth, however, was dampened by scope clauses that had been 
negotiated into pilot union contracts.  Concerned about the threat of mainline aircraft being replaced by 
regional jets, many pilot unions negotiated limitations on aircraft weight, seating capacity, fleet size, and 
scheduling.  In Fall 2001, for example, scope clauses at United limited the airline to operating only up 
to 65 regional jets with less than 50 seats and a maximum aircraft weight of 60,000 pounds.  Among the 
rules at Delta Air Lines were stipulations that 85 percent of its regional jets must be flown on routes less 
than 900 miles.18
One of the major strategic impacts of regional jets, however, is that they increased the competition 
between hub networks and enabled carriers to focus on high-revenue connecting passengers.  Where they 
replaced turboprops, regional jets brought upgraded service to smaller communities but also changed cost 
structures and profit thresholds of these routes.
Spending
With finely-tuned revenue management tools and new ways to compete, the major airlines thrived 
under the growth cycle of the economic bubble.  High profits gave labor unions some leverage to seek 
pay raises, and also made it possible for airline management teams to increase capital spending.  These 
dynamics increased the structural costs of the 
airline industry, and would affect profits during the 
subsequent downturn.
To analyze the impact of changes in costs at the 
US majors, DOT Form 41 data was analyzed.  
Unit costs for the various expense categories were 
calculated using total scheduled and nonscheduled 
ASMs.19  Figure 3-5 shows that average labor costs 
per ASM increased by 26 percent between 1994 
and 2001.  These increases outpaced the growth of 
costs in some other areas such as materials or other 
services, but this increase was more significant 
because labor had already been such a large 
component of the total operating costs.  Overall, 
labor costs had also increased as a percentage of 
total operating cost from 34.3 percent in 1990 to 
37.7 percent in 2001.  Part of the reason for the 
increase in labor costs is that the airlines were also 
under pressure to restore wage concessions that 
had been granted during the recession and traffic 
Figure 3-5: Growth in labor cost components 
per ASM at US Majors, 1984-2001.  Source: 
Author’s calculations from US DOT Form 41 data, 
Schedules P6  and T1.
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downturn of the early 1990’s.  With profits soaring 
under the umbrella of a growth environment, 
airlines were more able and willing to pay for 
expensive labor contracts to prevent disruptive 
strikes and to enable the introduction of new 
airplanes.
Capital spending was also a cost issue as airlines 
continued to undertake expensive airport 
improvement projects, deploy information 
technology systems, and renew aging aircraft 
fleets.  As the major network carriers tried to 
distinguish their travel product from one another 
as well as from their low-fare competitors, many 
focused on their connecting hubs.  Airlines spent billions of dollars to transform hub terminals at Newark, 
Dallas-Ft. Worth, Chicago, Miami, New York-Kennedy, Los Angeles, Detroit, and elsewhere.  To 
upgrade their customer image, airlines such as Continental and USAirways also embarked on large fleet 
replacement programs during the late 1990’s.  New airplanes were often more fuel efficient and cheaper 
to operate, but they added structural costs to the industry as airlines began to lease more aircraft instead of 
depleting cash reserves.  Figure 3-6 shows the annual deliveries from one major airplane manufacturer.20  
Airplane deliveries fell off during the mid-1990’s after the recession but peaked again in 1999 just as the 
industry headed into another downturn.  Because of the length of time that it takes to build an airplane, 
deliveries are slightly lagged behind the economy and airline profits cycles.  The result is that airplane 
commitments often coincide with the beginning of the industry downturns, and add extra expenses when 
airlines can least afford them.
 
In general, the major network carriers chose to compete with themselves and the rest of the industry 
by focusing their products and services on the premium, high-fare passengers identified and captured 
through revenue management systems.  Network development was focused to serve the frequency and 
connectivity needs of high-yield business travelers.  Services were enhanced with upgraded premium 
cabins, and both American and United removed rows of coach seats to offer increased legroom for 
premium passengers.  While this high-cost, high-service philosophy was successful during the economic 
bubble, however, changes in the economy and the dynamics of passenger demand would begin to affect 
the viability of these strategies by the late 1990’s.
3.3 Change in Passenger Dynamics
Except for only marginally successful attempts at developing low-cost divisions to compete with low-fare 
carriers, the major network carriers primarily relied on their product and revenue management systems 
to distinguish themselves and protect their revenue base.  This revenue base, however, began to change 
fundamentally as people began to purchase airline tickets in new ways and shifted their attitudes towards 
low-cost carriers during the late 1990’s.  This fueled the growth of the low-cost carriers, and these forces 
began to altogether change the competitive dynamics between the major network and low-fare segments 
of the airline industry.
Figure 3-6:  Boeing Airplane Deliveries through 
April 2003.  Source: Boeing.
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Demand for Low-Cost Travel
Smaller, nontraditional and often low-fare carriers enjoyed large increases in the overall market share 
during the 1990’s, and this had a substantial impact on the dynamics of the industry.  The relative change 
in RPM market share is shown in Figure 3-7.  While the legacy network carriers—including American, 
Continental, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, TWA, United, and USAir—accounted for 88.4 percent of the 
total market share of revenue passenger miles in 
1991.  By 2001, this had dropped to 73.1 percent.  
In contrast, Southwest increased its market share 
from 3.0 percent in 1991 to over 9.2 percent in 
2001, while the combined total of the other smaller 
carriers had a similar increase.    
The rapid growth and popularity of carriers such as 
AirTran or JetBlue also appears to reflect a change 
in public acceptance of low-fare travel.  While 
the physical scope and size of these networks did 
limit their actual travel utility, other issues such 
as safety and perceived quality also presented 
barriers to market penetration.  Such qualitative 
issues presumably contributed to the failure other 
low-fare carriers such as PeopleExpress, Kiwi, or 
Western Pacific.  Safety, for example, was often 
cited as a major concern with travelers flying on 
low-cost carriers.  The Valujet crash in the Florida Everglades in 1996 fueled these doubts.  Like other 
low-cost startup airlines in the early 1990’s such as Kiwi and Frontier, the business model at Valujet was 
to use old aircraft and reinforce its visible appearance of a low-cost operation.  This model backfired 
after the 1996 crash, however, as it was perceived that inexperienced, low-paid personnel and outsourced 
maintenance providers contributed to the crash.
To increase its credibility while maintaining its image as a low-cost carrier, Valujet merged with AirTran, 
took its name and acquired a brand-new fleet of 50 Boeing 717 airplanes.  Other new carriers such as 
JetBlue and National Airlines followed similar business strategies with new airplanes and unblemished 
safety records.  They also tried to compete with the major carriers by providing superior levels of service.  
JetBlue offered leather seats and live satellite television, while National included a first-class cabin and 
a comprehensive frequent flyer rewards program.  As this generation of low-fare carriers overcame 
the issues of safety and image, they began to present a real and credible threat to the traditional major 
network carriers throughout the country and even in specific home markets.  An analysis of itinerary-
level data from the DOT ten-percent ticket sample shows that AirTran has been able to penetrate Delta’s 
fortress hub at Atlanta, and has increased its share of the local origin-demand market from 9.9 percent in 
1998 to 14.0 percent in 2001.  JetBlue has been able to capture 28.6 percent of the local market at New 
York-JFK within two years of its startup in 2000.21
Change in Customer Behavior
One of the other factors that contributed to the change in attitudes towards low-fare travel had to do with 
changes in how tickets were purchased.  The advent of the internet and web-based ticketing appears 
to have enabled passengers to place a greater emphasis on ticket value rather than travel time or other 
Figure 3-7:  Domestic market share of US Ma-
jors and other carriers, 1991 and 2001.   Source: 
US DOT Form 41 data, Schedule T-1. 
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service characteristics.  Airlines began to rapidly implement web-based ticketing processes because 
it provided an extremely low-cost means of product distribution—providing substantial savings as 
compared to traditional telephone customer reservations systems, city ticket offices, or even travel agent 
commissions.
To help attract customers to their websites, airlines marketed the price-saving benefits of online 
ticketing—enabling passengers to easily search for flights based on price instead of schedule.  Other 
third-party websites such as Travelocity or Orbitz also focused on comparing prices instead of travel time. 
The perhaps unintended outcome of these features was that it changed the way passengers perceived the 
value of air travel.  When customers were given the ability to book flights themselves, they became more 
willing and able to take the time to find the lowest fares and rearrange their activity schedules in order to 
save money.
By contrast, traditional distribution methods involving travel agents and airline reservation systems 
provided little incentive and made it often difficult for customers to find the lowest airfares.  Web-based 
booking engines also gave customers more access and exposure to the schedules and fares of lesser-
known, low-cost airlines such as Southwest or JetBlue.  This would increase their visibility and market 
competitiveness with the network carriers.  It also affected the strategic advantage of tightly scheduled 
hub-and-spoke operations.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
3.4 The Bubble Pops
During the internet bubble, the industry had 
evolved into a two-tiered system consisting of 
major network carriers and low-cost regional 
airlines.  Continued growth, as well as the effects 
of yield management systems and differences in 
route connectivity noted earlier, had been able to 
somewhat insulate each segment of the industry 
from direct competition.  Yet one of the crucial 
dynamics that began during the late 1990’s was 
a change in the demand for air travel as both 
business and leisure travelers became more 
sensitive to price.  With more acceptable and 
lower-cost alternatives, people began changing 
their travel behaviors rather than tolerate price 
“bidding” from yield management systems.  
The end of the internet bubble had effectively 
placed an end to traffic growth and capped the 
amount of revenues which could be extracted from 
the passenger base.  Since the economic “pie” 
stopped growing, the majors found themselves 
in competition with the low-cost carriers for 
passengers who were no longer willing to pay 
for premium services.  The economic slowdown 
is shown in Figure 3-8 using seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data on GDP from the US BEA.  
Figure 3-9:  Downshift in fare types.   Source: 
Belobaba (2002) from IATA data.
Figure 3-8: Quarterly change in GDP, 1990-
2002.   Source: US BEA data.
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Quarterly GDP growth peaked in the fourth quarter 
of 1999 at 7.1 percent, then began sliding down 
through 2000 until it declined to a negative 1.6 
percent in the second quarter of 2001.
  
In addition, the softening economy began to drive 
passengers from higher, flexible tickets to lower 
fares.  Key traffic indicators during the first half 
of 2001 showed that traffic had already begun to 
soften and shift between fare types.  Figure 3-9 
shows the quarterly change in IATA passenger 
traffic by fare category.22  First class traffic during 
the first half of 2001 dropped by 15 to 20 percent 
over 2000 levels, while business class traffic 
dropped by about 10 percent.  Coach passenger 
traffic, however, continued to grow by about 
5 to 7 percent.  In addition, average fares also 
began dropping by March 2001.  This presented 
a major threat to airline revenues because yield 
management systems had enabled airlines to 
rely on a small number of passengers for a 
disproportionately high percentage of the revenue.  
A common industry rule-of-thumb was that ten 
percent of the passengers produced half of the 
overall revenue.23 
Airlines responded to the downturn in traffic by 
reducing fares to stimulate traffic.  Industry data 
on airfares for a typical 1,000-mile domestic trip 
was used to analyze the change in airfares, and is 
plotted in Figure 3-10.24  Airfares had grown in 
1995 and 1996, but stayed relatively flat during 
1997, 1998 and 1999 before increasing about 3 to 
5 percent during 2000.  Between February and August 2001, however, the average airfares actually began 
to decrease significantly below the prior-year levels.  By August of 2001, average domestic airfares were 
already about 12 percent less than they were at the same time in 2000.  
The shift to low-fare tickets and the decline in airfares had a major impact on the financial performance 
and yields of the airline industry.  Losses at the US majors began in the fourth quarter of 2000 at 
United and were followed in the first quarter of 2001 at Delta and American.  The exception to this was 
Southwest, however, as its low-fare business model enabled it to maintain its profitability as the other 
carriers began to face major losses.  Stock prices consequently dropped at the major network carriers, and 
investors began to withdraw capital from these airlines and the industry as a whole.  Figure 3-11 shows 
the changes in the market capitalization of several major carriers between 1995 and 2001.  The decline at 
Delta and American started in mid-1999 can be seen, but perhaps more notable is the increase in market 
cap value at Southwest.  This showed that investors had a much stronger perception of the long-term 
market prospects of Southwest and was also indicative of the increased market for low-fare travel.
Figure 3-10:  Year-over-year change in domestic 
airfares, 2000-2001.  Source: Katherine Andrus, 
ATA data.  
Figure 3-11:  Market capitalization of selected 
US major carriers, 1995-2001.  Source: Author’s 
calculations from WRDS data.
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In the wake of the post-bubble economic recession, the airline industry by mid-2001 had become 
increasingly aware of declining revenues amidst persisting issues with service quality and flight 
delays.  Structural industry-wide issues of low-fare competition and productivity, however, were only 
compounded by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and passenger traffic plummeted in the days and 
weeks after 9/11.  Since the post-bubble economic conditions had already placed the major US airlines 
in a particularly vulnerable financial position, they were quick to implement drastic schedule reductions 
and other cost-cutting measures.  The airlines also grappled with new costs and delays associated with 
expanded security procedures, and experimented with new pricing strategies to restore traffic and 
revenues.  This chapter will explore how the short-term operational responses were part of a larger 
industry restructuring which would have arguably occurred even if 9/11 had not happened.
4.1 Industry Performance
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 involved the unprecedented use of commercial airliners filled with revenue-
paying passengers as weapons of mass destruction.  The Secretary of Transportation ordered a complete 
ground stop of all non-military aviation activity, and all flights in the United States were ceased within a 
matter of hours.  The shutdown of national airspace lasted two days.  Operations at Washington-Reagan 
National Airport were disrupted for several months, and the airport only reopened after additional 
security measures were implemented on all incoming and outgoing flights.  Thousands of passenger 
itineraries were disrupted, and airlines collectively lost billions of dollars of revenue from the shutdown 
of operations.  
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This event had a major impact on the perception of the safety of air travel, and security concerns 
dramatically decreased the demand for air travel.  People stopped most nonessential business and 
personal travel, and it is believed that 9/11 helped to increase the use of videoconferencing and other 
telecommunications systems as travel alternatives.  This following section will look at how 9/11 affected 
the performance of the airline industry in areas such as capacity, passenger traffic, and revenues.
Traffic, Capacity, and Fares
To compare the changes to industry supply and demand of air travel, industry data on monthly passenger 
traffic and airline seats was analyzed between 2000 and 20003.  Figure 4-1 shows the year-over-year 
domestic traffic measured in Revenue Passenger Miles, while Figure 4-2 shows the supply measured in 
Available Seat Miles.  As Figure 4-1 shows, passenger traffic during the first half of 2001 had grown only 
slightly over 2000 levels—less than one percent on average.  August 2001 was a strong month, however, 
and domestic RPMs increased by about 4 percent.  After 9/11, however, traffic immediately dropped by 
about 20 percent for the month of October over prior-year levels.  Traffic slowly came back, however, and 
the average drop for the last quarter of 2001 was about 16 percent below 2000 levels.  Revenue passenger 
miles in March 2003 are still about 90 percent of 2000 levels.
Figure 4-2 shows that between January and August of 2001, domestic ASMs had averaged about 2.7 
percent above prior-year levels.  The drop in ASMs after 9/11 meant that in October 2001, capacity was 
about 15 percent below 2000 prior-year levels.  Capacity was gradually phased back into the system, and 
capacity in the summer of 2002 was about 7 percent below 2001 levels and 4 percent below 2000 levels.  
Figure 4-4:  Average domestic load factors, 
2000-2003.  Source: ATA data.
Figure 4-3:  RPMs as percentage of 1999 levels, 
2000-2003.  Source: ATA data.
Figure 4-2:  Domestic capacity in ASMs, 2000-
2003.  Source: ATA data.
Figure 4-1:  Domestic traffic in RPMs, 2000-
2003.  Source: ATA data.
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Capacity in March 2003 was still down about 9 
percent below 2001 and 2000 levels.
Figure 4-3 shows the RPMs as a percentage of 
1999 levels.  It shows that while traffic in 2000 
and 2001 stabilized at about a five percent average 
growth over prior-year levels, that traffic still 
remains below 1999 levels.  Despite the decline 
in traffic, the reduced capacity has been returning 
average load factors to previous levels.  As shown 
in Figure 4-4, the annual average load factor for 
2001 was 69.5 percent, while it was 71.7 percent 
in 2000.  Load factors in 2002 and the first quarter 
of 2003 averaged 70.5 percent.  It should be noted, 
however, these load factors represent record highs; 
by comparison, load factors in the mid-1980s were 
around 60 percent.  There are operational limits 
to high load factors due to passenger no-shows 
and variability in time-of-day and day-of-week 
demand.
Figure 4-5 shows the annual change in average 
airfares for a 1,000-mile hypothetic trip (excludes 
Southwest).  The change in demand and increased 
low-fare competition is clearly evident throughout 
2001, and fares continued to drop from 2000 
levels.  The decline bottomed out in October 2001 
at almost 20 percent below the prior-year.  The 
decrease gradually slowed and leveled off by 
September 2002.
The divergence of rising airline costs and decreasing passenger revenues is extremely evident in an 
examination of the system-wide actual and breakeven load factors.  Although pricing and supply are 
disconnected in practice, Figure 4-6 links these two concepts in order to better show the trend of falling 
ticket prices, rising costs, and shrinking profit margins.  During the economic bubble, costs stayed 
relatively stable with breakeven load factors remaining at about 64 to 66 percent between 1995 and 1999.  
Load factors during this same period increased from 67 percent up to 71 percent and corresponded to the 
record industry profits.  Costs began to increase, however, and the breakeven load factors increased to 
70 percent in 2000 and 77 percent in 2001.  With the impact of 9/11, the actual load factor dropped to 62 
percent—thus illustrating the operational evidence of the major industry losses. 
Financial Performance
Despite the restoration of load factors, the price and revenue equilibrium has nevertheless shifted 
considerably.  In the months since 9/11, the industry has continued to suffer record losses.  In 2001 and 
2002, the industry lost $18 billion dollars, and current projections are losses of $8 billion dollars for 2003. 
US carriers have historically experienced losses during recession periods, but the magnitude of the current 
losses for the major carriers (excluding Southwest) is clearly unprecedented.  Coupled with the impacts of 
Figure 4-5:  Annual change in average domes-
tic airfare.  Source: ATA data.
Figure 4-6:  Domestic breakeven and actual 
load factors.  Source: Katherine Andrus, ATA.
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9/11, the enormity of these losses has transformed 
the financial environment of the airline industry 
and threatens the long-term sustainability of the 
traditional large US network carriers.
Profits.  Airline losses increased significantly 
after the 9/11 attacks, even after billions of dollars 
in government aid intended to cover the loss 
of revenue during the two-day shutdown of the 
national airspace.  In the six quarters following 
the 9/11 attacks, the three largest US carriers 
collectively lost over $10.3 billion dollars.   Figure 
4-7 shows the reported quarterly statements for 
American, Delta, United, and Southwest Airlines.  
Of these four airlines, Southwest Airlines was 
the only one to remain profitable following the 
events of 9/11, although its profits have eroded 
considerably.  Net profits at Southwest in the first 
quarter of 2003 amounted to only $24 million 
dollars, compared to $191 million in the second 
quarter of 2002.
To show the relationship between unit costs and 
revenues, Figure 4-8 shows the net profit per 
available seat-mile unit for five of the major 
carriers.  It shows that the profits began to drop 
below costs in the second half of 2000.  United 
and USAirways had major spikes in the third and 
fourth quarters of 2001 as they reduced their networks (less ASMs) without being able to reducing their 
costs accordingly.  It shows that Delta is the closest of the big three network carriers to achieving financial 
stability.
Financial Markets.  The investment capital markets have recognized that the traditional major US 
network airlines have little prospects for long-term profitability, and have shifted market capital to 
low-fare carriers including Southwest and JetBlue.  Figure 4-9 shows that Southwest Airlines market 
capitalization was substantially greater than the rest of the major airlines and JetBlue combined.  JetBlue 
had a valuation 10 times greater than that of United 
Airlines, even though its route network, passenger 
traffic, and revenues are only a fraction of those 
at United.  Figure 4-10 reflects the dramatic 
decline in stock prices during 2001 and 2002.  
Even stocks of well-performing airlines have lost 
value.  Continental has lost over 80 percent of its 
value, dropping from over $50 to under $10.  Also 
notable is that even Southwest has lost over 54 
percent of its original value at the beginning of 
2001, and JetBlue over 46 percent of its value from 
its initial public offering.
Figure 4-9:  Relative share of market capitaliza-
tion, US majors with Jet Blue, March 18, 2003.  
Source:  Author’s calculations from Yahoo! Finance 
data.
Figure 4-7:  Quarterly profits of selected US 
major carriers.  Source: Airline press releases.
Figure 4-8:  Net Profit per ASM, 1997-2002.  
Source:  Form 41 data and airline financial re-
leases.
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The poor financial prospects of the airline industry are also reflected in the changes in the overall 
market capitalization of the airline industry.  Market capitalization is the stock price times the number of 
outstanding shares that are available to trade.  This measures the relative attractiveness of airline stocks 
and their long-term value.   What is also significant is that the markets have withdrawn $14.8 billion 
dollars in market value from the US majors, JetBlue, and AirTran between August 2001 and December 
2002.  Between May 2002 and March 2003, over $15.2 billion dollars have been withdrawn from the 
entire US airline industry—including the national and regional carriers.
Figure 4-11a shows the resulting imbalance in relative market share and market capitalization.  Here, 
market share is calculated as the percentage of the total RPMs for the US majors and JetBlue.25  In March 
2003, Southwest had over 50% of the market capitalization but only about 10% of the market share.  
Conversely American, United, and Delta had the largest share of passenger traffic, but were among 
the lowest in terms of market capitalization.  Figure 4-11b shows the change in Market Cap and RPM 
share between August 2001 and March 2003.  Southwest hardly increased its market share, but had a 
tremendous jump in its relative market importance.  Delta dramatically increased its market share, but lost 
market value.  American, United, US Airways, and Continental both lost market share and market cap.   It 
is clear that financial markets are withdrawing money from the airline industry, and a significant share of 
Figure 4-10:  Major airline stock prices in the months before and after 9/11.  Source WRDS data.
Figure 4-11a:  Plot of relative Market Capitalization in March 2003 vs. RPM Share in February 
2003.  Source:  Author’s calculations from Yahoo! Finance data and airline news releases. 
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the national air transportation lift capacity is at risk of financial insolvency.  The disconnection between 
transportation productivity and financial sustainability poses some significant challenges for the airline 
industry and government.
4.2 Operational Response to 9/11
In response to the dramatic downturn in travel demand after 9/11, the major US airlines quickly curtailed 
flight schedules by about 20 percent and initiated longer-term steps to improve operational efficiency 
and stem major financial losses.  Fundamental changes to airline business practices were also designed 
to reduce costs, while new passenger fees were intended to increase revenues and stimulate demand 
for higher-fare tickets.  At the same time, increases in external cost categories such as fuel or insurance 
continued to affect airline profitability.
  
Route and Schedule Changes
As it became apparent that traffic had fallen considerably after 9/11, many carriers made drastic 
operational changes to reduce their flight schedules by 10 to 20 percent.  To achieve the 10 to 20 percent 
reduction in flight schedules, the major carriers reduced service at the major hubs, reduced frequencies, 
shifted to smaller airplanes, and even selectively eliminated service to smaller cities.  Many of these 
schedule changes were made within a matter of weeks after 9/11, and thus may not have been optimal due 
to the organizational complexities of crew and aircraft scheduling.  These service changes nevertheless 
largely preserved the integrity and connectivity of the overall hub-and-spoke networks.  Large hub-and-
spoke networks provide the most cost-efficient method to consolidate traffic and serve multiple markets 
with the least number of flights.  Maintaining the scope and scale of these operations was thus necessary 
to retain a strategic advantage over smaller, low-cost carriers, and the route and schedule changes adopted 
by the major carriers after 9/11 generally reflected this philosophy.
Figure 4-11b.  Plot of change in relative market capitalization and major RPM share, August 2001 
to March 2003.  Source:  Author’s calculations from WRDS data, Yahoo! Finance, and airline news re-
leases. 
40 41
Service changes.  Smaller cities with low frequencies, light traffic, and close proximity to larger markets 
are always particularly vulnerable to service cutbacks during tough economic times.  After 9/11, typical 
network changes at the major carriers included shifting to smaller regional jet or turboprop aircraft or 
even the outright termination of all service.  Examples at Continental Airlines include the discontinuation 
of all service to the cities of Abilene, Tyler, and Waco in Texas, Daytona Beach and Melbourne in Florida, 
and Atlantic City in New Jersey.  It should be noted that all these cities were within about a 2-hour drive 
of major cities where service was maintained (Dallas-Ft. Worth, Orlando, and Philadelphia, respectively).  
Similarly, United ended service to Bellingham, WA, Little Rock, AR, Lynchburg, VA, Victoria, BC, 
Mobile, AL, Newport News, VA, and Staunton, VA.
Regional Jets.  Airlines began to use regional jets (RJs) in more strategic and creative ways after 9/11.  
Regional jets were cheaper to fly than larger aircraft, and their smaller capacity would also enable them 
preserve market share.  RJs began to be used to replace larger aircraft on routes where demand had 
dropped and which could no longer support larger aircraft.  Regional jets have a seating capacity for 35 
to 70 passengers—giving them the ability to fly at higher load factors and increasing overall profitability.  
Although regional jet routes were seamlessly integrated into the network schedules and pricing systems of 
the major carriers, they were often operated by independent subsidiaries or carriers like American Eagle 
or Skywest Airlines.  These carriers typically had substantially lower pay scales.  For example, an analyis 
of DOT Form 41 data shows that the average flight crew operating cost at American Airlines in the 2nd 
quarter of 2000 was $480 per block-hour.  By comparison, the average cost at American Eagle was $123 
per block-hour.  
American Airlines replaced all of its services to cities in upstate New York (Albany, Syracuse, Rochester, 
Buffalo) with regional jets.  It is also thought that this represents a shift in strategy from market share 
dominance to revenue dominance.  Larger aircraft would enable a given carrier to maintain a large market 
share by meeting all of the potential demand—including low-fare passengers who were often carried at, 
near, or even below the flight operating costs.  With smaller airplanes, these passengers could be simply 
foregone or “spilled” in lieu of higher-revenue or connecting passengers.
RJs were also used to introduce jet competition and enhance route networks in markets that would be 
unable to support larger aircraft.   American Airlines deployed its regional jets to build up its “focus city” 
presence at Raleigh-Durham and in the Boston-New York-Washington DC corridor.  Airlines also used 
regional jets on some hub-bypass flights, including routes such as between Los Angeles and Albuquerque. 
In essence, the RJs were able to act as strategic placeholders to preserve market presence and hub feeds 
until the traffic levels would return to previous and sustainable levels.  Similar strategies were adopted by 
Continental, Delta, and USAirways.
Hub Modifications.  Preserving the connectivity of major hubs and minimizing the disruption to complex 
aircraft and crew rotations while achieving a 10 to 20 percent schedule reduction was a major task at the 
major carriers after 9/11.  At two of the major carriers, the immediate reduction in capacity was achieved 
by eliminating the last bank of flights at major hubs.  Figure 4-12 shows the scheduled departures per 
15-minute period by American Airlines at its Dallas-Ft. Worth hub.  In the August 2001 schedule, the last 
two sets of flights operated by American would depart at around 8 and 10pm.  By the end of September, 
the flights around 10pm were eliminated.  Similar types of service cutbacks were observed at other hubs, 
including Continental’s hub at Houston.  These moves highlighted the strategic importance of hub-and-
spoke systems and network connectivity.
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One of the other strategies was to improve the efficiency of hub operations and aircraft utilization by 
transforming the way in which flight arrivals and departures were scheduled.  Traditional hub-and-spoke 
systems used highly coordinated schedules to concentrate arrivals and departures in as short of a time 
as possible to minimize the connection time between the first arrival and the last departure.  Typically, 
a bank will last between 60 and 90 minutes and places a heavy peak loading on gates and terminal 
staffing—up to 80 aircraft may converge at a major hub at a single time.  Rolling bank systems, however, 
spread out the arrivals and departures in a more even fashion to enable greater aircraft and gate utilization. 
Aircraft utilization is a key factor in airline productivity, as airplanes are only producing revenue while in 
the air with revenue passengers.
Figure 4-13 shows the shift that American Airlines made in November 2002 at Dallas-Ft. Worth from a 
highly peaked banking structure to a rolling bank.  The airline expects to gain the equivalent of 17 new 
aircraft through scheduling efficiencies and reductions in terminal staffing and infrastructure costs.26  It 
is also worth noting that the rolling banks are more robust and less susceptible to major interruptions due 
to weather or Air Traffic Control (ATC) delays—thus resulting in additional operational cost savings.  
However, these operational efficiencies come at the cost of increased passenger travel times and may 
reduce the effective connectivity in some city-pair markets.  When American Airlines debanked its 
Chicago O’Hare hub, average passenger connection times went up 10.7 minutes.27
Cost-cutting Measures
Faced with dramatic changes in the passenger revenue base and mounting losses, the airlines aggressively 
implemented cost-cutting measures wherever possible.  One of the major cost-cutting efforts was the 
accelerated retirement of older airplanes and the consolidation of aircraft fleets.  This provided a means 
to both reduce network capacity and trim operating costs.  The major US domestic carriers parked over 
450 aircraft between June 2001 and 2002, including 205 older 727s, 39 DC-9s, and 37 DC-10s.  Thus, 
one of the unexpected results of 9/11 was a modernization of the US commercial airline fleets.  Most of 
the aircraft withdrawn from service included older airplanes with high operating and maintenance costs.  
Aircraft such as the 727 and the DC-10 often had higher operating expenses due to their less fuel-efficient 
Figure 4-12:  Histogram of scheduled depar-
tures per 15-minute period showing elimination 
of last hub “bank” after 9/11.  Source: Author’s 
calculations from American Airlines electronic 
timetable data.
Figure 4-13:  Histogram showing conversion 
to rolling hub schedule at Dallas-Ft. Worth.  
Source: Author’s calculations from American Air-
lines electronic timetable data.
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engines and more expensive three-person cockpit crews.  Figure 4-14 shows the block-hour operating 
cost benefit gained by replacing an older B727-200 with a new A320.28  Some brand-new 777s and 747-
400s were also temporarily parked, however, as the downturn in international traffic meant that revenue 
opportunities for these airplanes were extremely limited. 
One of the other factors behind the fleet consolidation strategies is the cost of operating large, diverse 
aircraft fleets.  The cost and complexity of specialized maintenance and dedicated flight crews must be 
balanced with the revenue benefits.  Many carriers determined that these costs outweighed the benefits 
after 9/11, and many carriers used the downturn in demand as an opportunity to increase overall aircraft 
utilization and improve efficiency.  In conjunction with these accelerated airplane retirements, several 
major carriers also eliminated specialized low-cost niche services with dedicated aircraft subfleets—
often using older 737 airplanes.  In late 2001, United eliminated its West Coast shuttle product, while 
USAirways discontinued Metrojet.  Delta is currently in the process of restructuring its DeltaExpress 
product.  
Another area where airlines tried to implement 
cost-cutting measures was in the area of labor.  
With labor costs having increased by 13.5 
percent in the five years prior to 2001,29 airlines 
had already been under significant pressure to 
significantly cut labor costs prior to 9/11.  In the 
weeks and months after September 11th, the drastic 
schedule cuts and large losses made it necessary 
for US airline industry to cut its workforce by 
over 80,000 employees.  At some airlines, job 
sharing programs and other incentives were used 
to minimize the number of layoffs in some work 
groups such as flight attendants.  Southwest and 
Alaska Airlines had a strong enough cash position 
that they were able to avoid layoffs directly 
associated with 9/11.  In all, approximately 
200,000 people in the airline industry and related 
suppliers throughout the world.
Finally, an uncertain financial environment led many airlines and airport authorities to re-evaluate the 
timing of major capital improvement projects.  At several airports, including Boston and New York-JFK, 
the traffic downturn created an opportunity to accelerate major terminal construction projects for Delta 
and America—resulting in reduced project costs.  In other cases, ambitious expansion plans were delayed 
or scrapped.  Large runway projects continued at St. Louis, Seattle, Minneapolis, and elsewhere, although 
critics used the traffic downturn to advance environmental agendas.
Distribution and Sales
The airlines also continued to work on their bottom line by reducing distribution costs and modifying 
pricing strategies.  One of the few successful areas where airlines have been able to reduce their costs is 
through direct sales distribution channels.  In order to gain more direct control over ticket distribution, 
airlines have drastically reduced or eliminated sales commissions to travel agents while promoting the use 
of web-based sales.  Airline tickets have been the leading source of sales on the internet.  In conjunction 
Figure 4-14.  Comparision of block-hour operat-
ing costs, B727-200 vs. A320 at United Airlines, 
2000.  Source:  US DOT Form 41, Schedule T-2.
$2,834
$2,209
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with the use of direct internet-based ticketing, airlines also became more aggressive at forcing passengers 
to switch over to paperless electronic tickets, and initially levied extra service charges for traditional 
paper tickets.  As cost-cutting measures became more aggressive during 2002, airlines such as American 
announced that they would completely eliminate paper ticketing and would thus save on manual ticket 
processing and accounting costs.  
Other changes intended to increase revenues and improve ticket agency efficiency were ticketing 
restrictions and change fees.  USAirways and other airlines also introduced the requirement that tickets 
lost all value once the flight had departed—previously, tickets retained their value for up to a year.  New 
processing fees of $75 and $100 were implemented to change itineraries, date of travel, or to allow 
standby travel on the most restricted tickets.  At some airlines, excess baggage fees were also more 
aggressively enforced, and gate or ticket agents lost some degree of flexibility and discretion in the shift 
in balance between customer service and revenue control.
Other threats
Increased expenses for fuel, insurance, and new 
security measures have offset some of the cost 
savings achieved in other parts of the airline 
business.  Figure 4-15 shows that domestic spot 
fuel prices had declined to under $0.40 per gallon 
in 1999, but had increased considerably to over 
$1.00 per gallon near the end of 2000, and then 
declined during 2001 to a low of about $0.50 cents 
per gallon.  Although fuel prices continued to rise 
steadily during 2002, airlines were still able to 
achieve cost savings through price hedging and 
bulk purchasing.  Southwest Airlines, for example, 
reported that it saved nearly $77 million dollars 
through its hedging program during the first quarter 
of 2003.
Insurance costs also increased significantly after 9/11, as commercial airplanes suddenly became 
considered potential weapons of mass destruction.  Insurance costs for the second quarter of 2002 jumped 
almost 300% over the same period in 2001.30  On September 17, 2001, the insurance industry cancelled 
third-party war risk liability policies with a 7-day notice.  Coverage was eventually obtained, although 
premiums increased by over $2 billion dollars worldwide.  US airlines paid over $400 million for hull, 
passenger, cargo, and corporate liability insurance in each of the second and third quarters of 2002 
alone.31  Individual states and organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
or the International Air Transport Association (IATA) are working to pool risk and reduce the cost impact 
on airlines.
Security Costs.  Concerns about terrorism after 9/11 and the resulting changes in security procedures 
have led to significantly increased costs for US airlines.  The federalization of passenger screening 
processes, new complex baggage screening requirements, and other measures under consideration 
have increased the direct costs of security.  New electronic checked baggage screening requirements 
pose substantial design and cost challenges.  The capability and size of current explosive detection 
technologies means that many airports will need to locate these machines in airport terminal lobbies or 
Figure 4-15: Domestic spot fuel prices, 1999-
2003.   Source: ATA from US DOT data.
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new outbuildings to permit passenger queuing and 
false alarm reconciliation.  The aggregate total cost 
of reconfiguring terminal facilities could easily 
range in the neighborhood of several building 
dollars, and that does not cover the expense of 
each machine itself (over $1 million each).  The 
imposition of a January 2003 implementation 
deadline may also have limited the search for 
efficient, cost-effective solutions, and yet these 
systems may become a structural part of the air 
transportation system for a number of years to 
come.  
Externalities.  After 9/11, the reduced efficiency 
of the aviation system threatened airline businesses by making alternative modes of transportation more 
attractive.  Additional security procedures led to highly unpredictable and lengthy queuing for check-in, 
security processing, and boarding—imposing a significant time penalty on total travel time.  Security 
irregularities such as improperly screened passengers, unplugged magnetometers, or in-flight incidents 
were treated much more seriously and had a much greater impact on the system after 9/11.  A security 
breach at the Atlanta’s Hartsfield International Airport on November 17, 2001, for example, caused 11,000 
passengers to be evacuated from the terminal.  A survey of national media sources found that reported 
security breaches occurred over 43 times between November 2001 and March 2002.32  At several of these 
airports—including Baltimore and Boston—multiple breaches occurred within days of each other.  Like 
any other delay, security incidents could easily propagate throughout entire airline networks as aircraft 
rotations were disrupted.
The 10 to 20 percent reduction in flying alleviated pressure on airspace capacity and reduced overall 
flight delays.  Figure 4-16 shows that air traffic control delays in 2002 have dropped by 10 to 15 percent 
over 2000 or 2001 levels.  Delays during 1999, 2000, and 2001 had increased by about 50 percent over 
the previous three years, and the 9/11 cutbacks helped to reverse this trend of increasing flight delays.  
Together, the combination of reduced flight delays and increased passenger delays have shifted the 
operational constraints of the air transportation system from the airside (flight component) to the landside 
(airport access/egress).  Airports are adaptive systems and had been impedance matched to the flows 
before 9/11, and passenger-handling processes had been adapted to match gate and runway service rates.  
These delays should be minimized as airports and airlines gain operational experience with the new 
environment.
4.3 9/11 and Restructuring
Despite the operational changes after 9/11, the profitability of the US majors continued to be battered 
by larger issues of low-cost competition and labor productivity.  The relatively low cost structures of 
airlines such as Southwest, AirTran, or JetBlue made them less vulnerable to the downturn in traffic and 
revenues after 9/11.  As the revenue bases at the US major airlines continued to erode, the competition 
with low-cost carriers rose to the forefront of restructuring issues facing the US majors.  In addition, labor 
negotiations and attempts to reduce operating costs also achieved a new sense of urgency during 2002 and 
2003 as airlines dipped into or loomed under the threat of bankruptcy.  
Figure 4-16.  ATC Delays, 1999-2003.  Source: 
Hansman, 2003.
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These factors, combined with the record losses, increased pressure on the federal government to rescue 
the airlines and stabilize the air transportation system.  While billions of dollars were paid out to 
compensate for the two-day shutdown of the national airspace system, a controversial loan guarantee 
program was also initiated to help airlines restructure their operations after 9/11.  This section focuses on 
how the industry-wide restructuring efforts after 9/11 were actually rooted in the changes to the supply 
and demand for air travel during the internet bubble.  
Low-Fare Competition
The relatively stronger operating financial position of the low-fare carriers gave them a profitability 
advantage during the downturn in traffic.  Competition between these two segments of the airline industry 
continued even despite the downturn in traffic after 9/11.  Low-cost carriers continued to expand their 
networks, while network carriers matched these moves and strengthened their hub operations.  Figure 
4-17 shows the continued expansion of available seat miles at JetBlue and AirTran in the quarters 
before and after 9/11.  With the availability of longer-range 737-700 aircraft, both Alaska and Southwest 
continued to introduce additional nonstop 
transcontinental flights.  AirTran continued to add 
cities throughout the Eastern part of the United 
States, and announced an expansion into West 
Coast markets from Atlanta beginning in the 
Summer 2003.  In general, these moves increased 
the amount of exposure between the network 
airlines and the low-cost carriers.
The major US airlines competed vigorously by 
matching routes, prices, and business models.  
American introduced competition to JetBlue in 
the Long Beach and Oakland markets with larger 
aircraft and similar fares.  The major carriers 
continued their strategic use of regional jets to 
increase their market presence and reinforce the 
hub structure of the major carriers, using their 
network breadth as a revenue advantage to compete with the low-cost carriers.  America West and other 
carriers transformed their pricing structures with lower fares for business travelers.  These airlines were 
also less dependent on high-yield business travelers—travelers whom had already largely disappeared or 
shifted to lower fares after the internet bubble burst in 2001.
Delta also tried to reinvent its low-cost unit to compete more with JetBlue’s image-conscious business 
model and less with AirTran or Southwest.  This new unit was branded with the name “Song,” and uses 
larger capacity 757 aircraft with state-of-the-art on-demand video, audio, and internet entertainment.  It 
began flying on April 15, 2003.  Even smaller airlines such as Midwest Express were considering low-
cost units, alongside major carriers like United and American.  The success of previous low-cost carrier-
within-a-carrier attempts at Continental, United, US Airways, and Delta has been rather limited. 
Figure 4-17: Expansion of Scheduled ASMs, 
JetBlue and AirTran.  Source: US DOT Form 41 
data, Schedule T-1 and airline traffic releases.
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Productivity
The decline in revenues and the increased exposure to low-cost competition has increased pressure on the 
major US airlines to cut costs.  Since labor represents 35 to 40 percent of the typical operating expenses 
for an airline, the renegotiation of major labor contracts presents opportunities to make substantial cost 
improvements.  Labor contract renegotiation is usually a lengthy process that can take many months or 
even years, however, and is highly dependent on the history of labor-management relations at each carrier. 
The long operating histories of the major US carriers and legacy issues surrounding organizational culture 
and labor relations can have a major impact on contract negotiations.  An atmosphere of mistrust at 
American Airlines, for example, recently led to the resignation of Chief Executive Officer Don Carty.
The threat of bankruptcy added another dimension to the labor negotiation process and affected contract 
negotiations throughout the industry.  Because bankruptcy enables an outside judge to force unions to 
accept contracts, it can help to facilitate and accelerate the contract renegotiation process since labor 
unions generally prefer to renegotiate their contracts themselves.  This external threat has facilitated the 
contract renegotiation process at American Airlines, where labor unions consensually worked to reduce 
annual costs by $1.8 billion dollars and eliminated over 7,000 positions.33  United Airlines filed for 
bankruptcy in December 2002, and is seeking $1.2 billion dollars in annual labor savings for a total of 
$5.8 billion dollars.34  US Airways was in bankruptcy between August 2002 and March 2003.  During 
that time, it renegotiated key labor contracts to save $1 billion dollars in annual costs and to provide 
some stability through the end of 2008. 35  As a result, the airline was also able to expand its regional jet 
operations to improve the competitiveness of its network.
Government Role
With the major airlines losing millions of dollars each day in the days and weeks after 9/11, the federal 
government was under intense political pressure to provide some kind of financial support for the airline 
industry before airlines began defaulting en-masse.  Yet as airlines were struggling to cope with record 
operating losses, the government was imposing costly new security requirements on the industry.  These 
added costs will have an impact on the demand 
for air travel, while government aid programs 
will affect the supply.  Together, these two forces 
have the potential to affect the ongoing industry 
restructuring effort.
Direct Aid.  Under the Air Transportation Safety 
and System Stabilization Act of 2001, the federal 
government paid out over $4.6 billion dollars to 
423 carriers as part of a compensation for direct 
and incremental losses resulted from the attacks of 
9/11 and the shutdown of the national airspace.36  
In addition, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 2003 reimbursed airlines for 
the $2.3 billion dollars in federal security fees that 
were collected between February 1, 2002 and April 
16, 2003.  The Act also waives the requirement that 
security fees be collected on airline tickets issued 
from June 1 to September 30, 2003.
Carrier Loan Guarantee Percent
World  $30   $27  90%
USAirways  $1,000   $900  90%
Frontier  $70   $63  90%
Aloha  $45   $41  90%
Evergreen  $150   $149  99%
ATA  $168   $149  88%
America West  $429   $379  88%
Total  $1,862  $1,679  90%
Rejected:  Great Plains, National, Spirit, Vanguard, 
MEDjet International, Corporate, United
Table 4-1.  Status of ATSB loan guarantee pro-
gram (dollar amounts in millions).  Source: US 
Department of Treasury Air Transportation Stabili-
zation Board.
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In addition, the Air Transportation Stabilization 
Board was authorized to process and distribute 
loan guarantees for financially troubled airlines 
to help with restructuring and recovery efforts.  
While this is essentially a cost-free way for the 
government to support the airline industry, critics 
have also charged that it is artificially contributing 
to the unprofitable environment—airlines with loan 
guarantees.  To date, the program has leveraged 
over $1.8 billion dollars in loans to seven carriers 
at a “cost” of under $1.7 billion dollars—about 90 
percent.  Table 4-1 shows the current recipients 
of loan guarantees.  US Airways, America West, 
and ATA are among the major carriers which 
received significant loan guarantees.  United’s 
application was initially rejected, although this 
decision is pending reorganization efforts.  The 
Air Transportation Stabilization Board rejected six 
national and regional carriers, and several of these 
carriers went into liquidation—including National, 
Vanguard, and Great Plains. 
Security Burden.  There are significant 
costs associated with new baggage screening 
requirements and more comprehensive passenger 
security checks.  A single explosive detection 
machine costs about a million dollars, and there 
is an estimated need for several hundreds of these 
machines at airports throughout the country.  A 
new universal identification requirement could cost the airlines up to $1 billion dollars to implement.  The 
Transportation Security Agency hired 55,600 federal screeners—an extremely costly endeavor.   The Air 
Transport Association notes that the new security measures, insurance, and other fees will add $4 billion 
dollars in annual costs to the airline industry.37
The question of how much of these long-term costs will be borne by air travelers continues to loom over 
the industry.  A counter-terrorism bill has authorized airports to levy a security fee of between $2.50 and 
$5.00 per segment, up to a maximum of $20 per ticket.  When all of these new taxes or user fees are 
added onto existing charges, the total additional costs represent a sizeable component of the total travel 
expenses.  Figure 4-18 shows the relationship between ticket price and tax rates.  Total taxes on a $200 
domestic ticket, for example, would average about $60—or about 30 percent of the total ticket price.  On 
an average $100 single-connection round-trip, total taxes are as high as 44 percent. 
Airline lobbying groups claim that they are the highest-taxed industry in the United States, and the issue 
of taxation has emerged as a major issue for the airline industry.  Because taxes affect the total out-of-
pocket cost of travel, the concern is that taxes can affect the extremely price-sensitive demand for travel.  
These regulatory changes add long-term structural costs onto the industry, and airlines have no control 
over these changes.  Also at issue is the process by which Congress and the Transportation Security 
Agency is imposing these new security requirements and additional costs onto the airline industry.  
Figure 4-18:  Federal taxes and airport facility 
charges as a percentage of total ticket price.  
Source: ATA data.
Table 4-2: Breakdown of taxes on a hypotheti-
cal single-connection round-trip w/ $4.50 PFC.  
Source: ATA. 
Total Ticket Price  $300
 
   Base (Airline) Fare  $242 
   Federal Ticket Tax   $18 
   Federal Flight Segment Tax  $12 
   Federal Security Surcharge  $10 
   Airport Passenger Facility Charge  $18 
Total Taxes and Fees   $58
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Safety and security are inherently related to consumer confidence and the growth or sustainability of air 
travel.  The federal government must balance regulatory environments in these areas with the financial 
incentives to maintain the profitability of the airline industry.   Air travel presents an attractive target for 
taxation and user fees, because of the relatively high price of airline tickets and the ability to discretely 
assign benefits to airline passengers.  Whether or not the cost of security and airport improvements are 
funded through user fees or the general funds remains a big issue.
Industry Restructuring
In one sense, the shock and awe from the attacks of 9/11 corrupted the market forces that would have 
otherwise played out.  As seen in Chapter 3, the fundamental forces concerning the change in travel 
demand and the competition between low-cost and network carriers were all present before 9/11.  The 
airline industry was thrust into the national spotlight after 9/11, however, and issues of financial viability 
were confounded by security threats and further shocks to travel demand.  As a result, the airlines may 
have potentially received government support for “stabilization” and restructuring and which might not 
have been otherwise available. 
The crisis also highlighted the vulnerability of airline jobs, however, and perhaps gave management 
teams more leverage over labor groups who might not have otherwise been as willing to accept such 
drastic cuts in wages and staffing levels.  Thus, while 9/11 increased the stakes and urgency of the game, 
it also prolonged the equilibrium of the system.  High structural costs and increased fees and taxes would 
certainly tend to favor the low-cost carriers, since they can offer overall lower fares and could thus 
capture a greater demand for travel.  Chapter 5 will attempt to place theses industry trends within the 
perspective of the overall air transportation system and will examine the implications for the industry.
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Despite ongoing restructuring efforts at several of the major carriers, the US airline industry continues 
to lose vast amounts of money—projected to be almost $10 billion dollars in 2003.  The more recent 
and ongoing impacts of the Iraq war and the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome are having 
serious impacts on international traffic and airlines in Europe and Asia.  With profitability not expected to 
recover until 2005, many of the traditional major network carriers are undergoing major restructuring to 
minimize losses and cope with the changes in industry dynamics.  This concluding chapter synthesizes the 
dynamics in the airline industry within a broader discussion of the role of the air transportation system.  
The key observations on the forces driving the ongoing industry restructuring will be presented.  Finally, 
the impacts of these dynamics on the economy and mobility will also be discussed with respect to the 
government’s role in the design and management of the air transportation system.
5.1 Summary observations
The main dynamics that are driving airline industry restructuring are centered around the relationship 
between the supply and demand of air travel, the reliance on the capital investment, and the competitive 
structure of the industry.  As seen previously, the current dynamics were shaped as the industry evolved 
through deregulation, the internet bubble, and the attacks of 9/11.  What follows is a set of brief summary 
observations that attempt to pull together the recent trends in the airline industry and set them within the 
broader context of the air transportation system.
Chapter 5:
Analysis and Outlook
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#1:  The air transportation system is robust
The experience of 9/11 has shown that the air transportation system can also handle large shocks in 
demand.  Today, the airlines are continuing to serve the mobility needs of the country, and industry cost 
restructuring is well underway.  Market forces of industry supply and consumer demand have historically 
driven the structure and form of the industry, but these forces will take time.  
#2:  Industry has bifurcated
The increased demand for low-cost air travel had contributed to the success of the low-cost carriers during 
the bubble, and this has essentially bifurcated the industry into the low-cost and major network groups.  
Whether or not such a two-tier industry is sustainable over the long-term is questionable, since low-
cost carriers will continue to exert downward pressure on the yields of the major network carriers even 
after the economic recession is over.  The product differentiation between the two groups will be hard to 
maintain, especially as the low-cost carriers add more transcontinental nonstop flights and the network 
carriers trim their costs and convert to less-convenient operations.  Yet the major network carriers could 
still restructure themselves in such a way that enables them to exploit the unit cost and revenue advantage 
of their larger planes, well-developed hubs, and international connectivity.  The question is whether 
or not the industry will converge on one business model and which one will succeed given the current 
environment of overcapacity and unsustainable prices.  
#3:  Disconnect between costs and passenger fares 
Costs increased at the major carriers during the economic upcycle, while fares dropped in the aftermath 
of the internet bubble.  Faced with increased competition from low-fare carriers, the traditional network 
carriers have recently been unable to maintain fares that are high enough to support their operating 
costs.  This has contributed to the decoupling of the price at which seats are sold from the costs and 
revenues needed to provide that service.  While this mismatch may have been absorbable under a growth 
environment like that during the Internet bubble, the current environment is leading to substantial losses.
#4:  Disconnect between capital markets and the airline business
Investors had been quick to push up the value of airline stocks as the airlines earned record profits during 
the Internet bubble, but were just as quick to devalue those stocks as the prospect of steep losses in 
the airline industry became apparent in 2001.  Steep declines in stock prices and market capitalization 
indicate that investors have lost confidence in the airline industry.  Yet political and economic inertia has 
kept the major carriers operating, even though it has not been proven that the current restructuring will 
return long-term earnings to meet investor expectations.  If the major carriers are to survive, they will 
have to develop a value proposition that justifies capital investment.
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#5:  Increasingly Unstable Cyclical Pattern of Profits and Losses
As noted in Chapter 1, the cyclic forces associated with the economy and the supply-demand marketplace 
of air travel has a strong impact on the performance of the airline industry.  Since deregulation, these 
forces have exhibited an exponentially growing oscillatory profit and loss behavior—the removal of 
government capacity controls and regulations have removed the dampening forces on the system and 
enabled the oscillations to grow.  This inherent instability could lead to major variations in service.
To further investigate this hypothesis, Jiang and 
Hansman38 performed a nonlinear least-square 
curve-fit using this net profit data in order to 
project future industry profits and losses for several 
years out into the future.  This curve is plotted in 
Figure 5-2 against a histogram of industry profits 
and losses.  Data on industry earnings since 1978 
and projected losses for January and February of 
2003 were used to estimate the equation for the 
sinusoidal curve.  The curve was also modified to 
account for the growing phase lag or delay, since 
it was observed that each profit or loss period was 
also getting longer over time as well as growing in 
amplitude.  
The model predicts that losses will exceed $15 
billion dollars in 2003 and that losses will continue 
until 2005.  Total losses for the period between 2000 and 2005 are projected to be over $50 billion 
dollars.  At the same time, however, industry profits are expected to skyrocket to $32 billion dollars in 
2008 and $39 billion in 2009.  While future profits of this magnitude are not necessarily likely and will 
be constrained by factors such as airspace capacity and regional development, the analysis does provide 
some insights into the air transportation system.  The increasing phase lag perhaps indicates that the 
system is getting less responsive.  As airlines get larger and competition exists among fewer carriers, 
it theoretically becomes harder for them to adapt to changes in market conditions.   The increasing 
amplitude would also corroborate the reduced responsiveness.    
5.2 Impacts
Given these basic dynamics that are reshaping the US airline industry, this section will investigate the 
potential impacts of these trends on the airline businesses and overall mobility—how these industry trends 
and dynamics relate to the bigger picture.  The flight of capital from the airline industry and the current 
financial crisis of the major airlines have clearly uncovered instabilities in the air transportation system 
as it is currently structured.  In a worst-case scenario, this crisis could result in several large airlines 
liquidating within the span of several weeks.  This would presumably leave a large market of pilots, 
airplanes, routes, and other assets.  It can be reasonably assumed that other airlines would step in to fill 
the market opportunities.  So, it is not necessarily likely that such a scenario would result the in the loss of 
service to any cities—or that it would even be bad for the industry.  But the question remains: what is the 
impact of air transportation on the larger economy and mobility?
Figure 5-1: Curve-fit projection of increasing 
oscillating profits and losses based on indus-
try net profits and losses.  Source: Jiang and 
Hansman, 2003.
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Air Transport and the Economy
The framework presented in Chapter 1 outlined the basic relationship between the air transportation 
system and the economy.  It was shown that economic growth in the 1990’s paralleled an increase 
demand for air travel but also enabled the airlines to adjust their business strategies accordingly.  The 
subsequent economic recession and a change in travel demand affected airline profits and led to declines 
in stock prices.  A poorly performing economy combined with declining returns on investment led to the 
withdrawal of market capital from the airline industry.
The structure of the airline industry and the supply of air travel is also closely coupled with the economy.  
As profits rise, there are incentives for airlines to add capacity, which drives profits down and reduces 
the supply.  While the growth of the low-cost carrier segment of the industry is partially due to this 
profit cycle, it appears to also be rooted in a more structural change in the demand for cheap air travel.  
The fundamentally cyclic nature of the economy is driving the slow demand for air travel, and the 
corresponding performance of the airline industry appears to closely mirror that of the US economy.
Air Transportation and Mobility
With the low-cost carriers challenging the established network carriers, one of the critical questions is 
how the surviving business model will affect overall mobility—including the community access to air 
service, travel time, and cost.  The fundamental demand for air travel should not abate, since there is no 
effective alternative to the speed and efficiency of jet airplanes.  
In theory, the economics of scale and scope will continue to favor hub-and-spoke networks, and these 
efficiencies will make it possible to preserve service to smaller communities.  Indeed, while some 
communities lost service after 9/11, many others received new regional jet connections to major hubs 
and other cities.  The range and speed of regional jets will enable smaller locales to be efficiently served 
through more distant hubs—increasing stage lengths and enable smaller regional hubs to be consolidated 
with larger ones.  This should also increase the efficiency of airline networks.  Runway and airspace 
capacity at the surviving hubs will remain a limiting factor, although rolling bank schemes may alleviate 
this pressure.
Overall travel times could be increased as airlines optimize their operations to increase aircraft utilization 
and minimize costs.  Passenger wait times could also increase as customer convenience becomes 
important in scheduling.  Transfers could also take longer if independent regional low-cost carriers 
replace the seamless networks of the major airlines.  Hub consolidation may also limit service in regional 
commuter markets, and slower modes of travel could have to replace shorter trips (under 300 miles, for 
example) between smaller cities and towns.  Flight delays were a critical issue prior to 9/11, and could 
return as a serious issue when the demand warrants that latent capacity is restored to the system.
Industry consolidation could also affect mobility.  On the one hand, reduced competition could lead to 
fare increases, and could reduce access to air travel services to the general public.  Yet even if one or 
more carriers are forced into liquidation, airfares will have to remain low in most markets due to the 
competition with low-cost carriers and the increased demand for low-fare products.  Smaller, low-growth, 
low-demand markets could also be threatened if airlines reduce competition for market share.
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5.3  Conclusion
Equitable and stable access to air service infrastructure are among the necessary conditions to enable 
economic growth.  The larger economic and social impacts of air travel need to be fully considered when 
evaluating the design, structure, and performance of the air transportation system.  High costs, long travel 
times, and other barriers to travel could suppress economic growth and quality of life in the United States. 
There is a role for government in stabilizing the dynamics of the air transportation system and ensuring 
public safety.  However, care must be taken to avoid artificially supporting untenable business models and 
suppressing innovation in the air transportation system.
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